


Briefing Book (Principals)

SSC VI
8/79

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Eleventh U.S. - Japan Security Subcommittee Meeting (SSC)

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31 July - 2 August 1979

Honolulu
Hawaii

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

21 July

Memo For
while in Taiwan,

Nugent or Jim

- ① Get Debrief from Armacost on anything discussed re: Taiwan with CINCPAC, i.e., AIT-CINCPAC relationship backchannel; "hit list" of how CINCPAC is being cut out, etc
- ② Debrief on what Sullivan thought on arms sales to Taiwan in 1980 issue
- ③ Hope fully, easier in trip he will get Lawrence & Sullivan "chop" on ~~treating~~ procedure to treat Taiwan Trip Requests (that Puckley will give him) and will have you or Jim call me to give me greenlight on Jim

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ELEVENTH MEETING
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES - JAPAN
SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
ILIKAI HOTEL, HONOLULU, HAWAII
SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

28 July 1979

0900	COMUSJAPAN and party arrives	HNL
29 Jul 1979		
0900	SSC XI Administrative office opens.	Molikai Room
1015	Japanese delegation arrives. Met by RADM Shelton and Mr Ohki, Japanese Consul General.	HNL
1230	Washington delegation arrives Met by LTGEN Poston.	HNL
1304	Golf hosted by Admiral Weisner	Navy Marine GC

30 July 1979

0900	Amb Mansfield arrives. Met by LTGEN Poston.	HNL
0945-1000	Japanese office call on Admiral Weisner (Mr. Watari, Mr. Nakajima, Mr. Ohki, VADM Sakonjo).	JOO office
0945-1000	Coffee for remainder of Japanese delegation hosted by LTGEN Poston with J02 and J heads.	ECR
1000-1100	Briefing for Japanese hosted BY JOO with J heads.	CCBR
1115-1300	Japanese lunch with MAJGEN Lynn	Schofield Brks
1300-1400	Aerial tour of military facilities for Japanese .	

1400	Japanese return to Ilikai Hotel except for VADM Sakonjo.	
1400-1600	US Unilateral Organizational Meeting.	Kauai Room
1415-1445	VADM Sakonjo office call on RADM Wentworth. Accompanied by CMDR Saito JMSDF LNO.	Pearl Harbor
1615-1815	Japanese Unilateral Organizational Meeting.	Kauai Room
1830-2000	No host get acquainted Cocktail party.	Imperial Suite
31 July 1979		
0900-1200	First Session	Hilo Suite
1215-1330	Luncheon hosted by Mr. Watari	Hana Suite
1400-1700	Second Session	Hilo Suite
1830-2030	Reception in-honor-of SSC XI participants hosted by Consul General Ohki.	Japanese Consulate. Aloha/casual attire. Bus transportation departs Ilikai at 1800 returns 2045.
1 August 1979		
0900-1200	Third Session	Hilo Suite
1215-1330	No host counterpart luncheon	Individually arranged.
1400-1700	Fourth Session	Hilo Suite
1830-2030	Reception in-honor-of GOJ participants hosted by Asst Secretary McGiffert	Derussey Hall, Hale Koa Hotel. Bus transportation departs Ilikai at 1820 returns 2015.

2 August 1979

0900-1200	Open session. Meeting if necessary.	TBA
0900-1030	Pearl Harbor tour for Japanese.	PACFLT Boat landing
0900-1100	Military to Military Meeting	ECR
1215-1330	Luncheon hosted by Asst Secretary McGiffert.	Hana Suite
1400-1700	Final Session. Free discussion.	Hilo Suite
1700	Amb Mansfield departs	HNL

3 August 1979

0930-1000	LTGEN Ginn office call on LTGEN Poston.	J01 office
1145	Japanese delegation departs	HNL
1600	Washington delegation departs	HNL
1700	COMUSJAPAN and party and remainder of Embassy Toyko party departs.	HNL

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- A. Itinerary
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Current Asian Situation (US LEAD)
 - 1. Session Summary and Talking Paper
 - Session 2 - Japan's Security Policy in the 1980's. (GOJ)
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Status of Guideline Implementation, Milestones,
Problem Area and Anticipated Results (US LEAD)
 - 2. Session Summary and Talking Paper
 - 2.1 Japan's Defense Policy/JSDF Posture in the 1980's.
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- D. Suggestions for Discussions Outside the Meetings
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11th SSC MEETING SCHEDULE

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SESSION	GENERAL TOPIC	SPECIFIC TOPIC	U.S. LEAD	SUPPORT	RESPONSE TO GOJ LEAD	OBJECTIVE
#1 31 JULY 0900-1200	OPENING STATEMENT	-	ASD:ISA	-	-	Convey atmosphere of informality/Agree on press coverage - None/
	GLOBAL SITUATION	SALT and US Nuclear Strategy Europe & NATO Mid-East, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean	ASD:ISA	JCS	-	Increase Japanese awareness of our mutual concerns in the global security environment.
	ASIAN SITUATION	Security Situation in East Asia US Responses	ISA	NSC		Reassure the Japanese we will remain a Pacific power; describe challenges in a way that invites GOJ to reconsider the adequacy of their own efforts.
#2 31 JULY 1400-1700	JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY IN THE 1980'S	Japanese Paper on Security	-	-	ISA/STATE	Support Japanese beliefs; probe future intentions in regional security involvement.
	STATUS OF GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTATION	Bilateral Planning Joint Exercises Training Intelligence Exchange	COMUS-JAPAN	ISA EMBASSY	-	Insure the GOJ that US is politically committed to bilateral planning to identify defense needs; to support continuation and sophistication of such efforts in the future.

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(Schedule)

SESSION	GENERAL TOPIC	SPECIFIC TOPIC	U.S. LEAD	SUPPORT	RESPONSE TO GOJ LEAD	OBJECTIVE
#3 1 AUGUST 0900-1200	LONG RANGE PROSPECTS FOR JAPAN'S DEFENSE	Weapons Systems & Force Security	-	-	PA & E CINCPAC	Discuss the adequacy of Japan's efforts in view of oil crisis, US limitations.
	US FORCE POSTURE IN ASIA AND INDIAN OCEAN IN 1980's	Soviet Military in Asia Developments in the Indian Ocean & Middle East US Indian Ocean Activities: Outlook for US in Asia in 1980's	JCS	CINCPAC	-	Describe realistically our force posture and explain our appreciation of the shared necessity in maintaining free trade access to these ocean areas.
#4 1 AUGUST 1400-1700	DEFENSE COOPERATION OBJECTIVES	Cost-Sharing Technology Transfer Interoperability Comparison with NATO	ISA	EMBASSY COMUS-JAPAN PA & E		Promote a further expansion of GOJ cost-sharing measures and explore informally various possibilities. Defuse Japanese criticism of unequal treatment compared to our NATO allies. Lay groundwork for ad hoc committee to discuss RSI, development, technology transfer, etc.

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SSC Schedule

All events listed at 111kai unless otherwise noted

Monday July 30

US Unilateral -time to be announced by Col Dewey.

1830-2030 No host Get Acquainted Cocktail Hour

Tuesday July 31

0900-1200 SSC Session I
1200-1400 Lunch hosted by Japanese Delegation
1400-1700 SSC Session II
1830-2000 Dinner hosted by Japanese Consul General (Japanese Consulate)

Wednesday August 1

0900-1200 SSC Session III
1200-1400 Lunch (as desired)
1400-1700 SSC Session IV
1830-2000 Reception hosted by Mr. McGiffert (Hale Koa Hotel)

Thursday August 2

1200-1400 Lunch hosted by US Delegation
1400-1700 Final SSC Session

*Dress for all meetings and all social functions is aloha casual.

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SCOPE PAPER
FOR THE ELEVENTH SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
31 July -- 2 August 1979

Last year's meeting reactivated the SSC following a four-year hiatus. The 11th meeting will again be held in Hawaii and will include policy level representatives from OSD, JCS, State, NSC, Embassy Tokyo, CINCPAC and USFJ, on the US side; and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency, and the Embassy on the Japanese side.

Because the SSC involves Washington and Tokyo policy-making levels, has traditionally placed a premium on informal and candid discussions, and does not seek to produce negotiated agreements or communiqus, it can reinforce what we are seeking to accomplish in bilateral defense planning as well as explore other aspects of defense cooperation.

SETTING

Defense is no longer a taboo subject in Japan. In part this reflects increasing Japanese apprehensions over the growth of Soviet military power in the Pacific (e.g., the anticipated deployment of the Minsk, access to facilities in Vietnam, and expanded military activities in the disputed Northern Territories); in part it reflects concerns about the US defense posture and the reliability of our support. The Self-Defense Forces presently enjoy unprecedented approval of the Japanese public: a broad national consensus supports continuation of the Security Treaty. The moderate opposition parties (Komeito, Democratic Socialists and New Liberal Club) have accordingly been more supportive of Japan's alliance with the US. Equally important, Japanese government officials have become noticeably more flexible and positive over the past two years in dealing with us on defense-related matters. Support for the Security Treaty and the SDF by the PRC has not only undermined much of the opposition from the Left but has focused Japanese concern more than ever on the Soviet threat. The one percent GNP limitation on defense spending is no longer a critical issue and has already been exceeded if US accounting procedures are utilized. The crucial question that needs to be addressed by both the US and the Japanese is not how much money should be spent but for what purposes.

The Japanese participants at the SSC are generally willing and eager to expand defense cooperation. They recognize the virtues of interoperability; they acknowledge the necessity of expanded cost-sharing arrangements; they will be looking for ways of increasing cooperation in such areas as intelligence, logistics, C3, exercises, and training although they will want to take their time to develop Japanese methodologies for meeting our desires. They will be rather broad-gauged officials whose interest vis-a-vis US policy and force structure are not confined to WESTPAC. Despite these common perceptions, there are also strong bureaucratic rivalries between Foreign Ministry and JDA officials which may be reflected in the substantive exchanges.

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Our broad goals in the talks must be to consolidate current trends in our defense relationship; keep Japan closely tied to the United States; assure that as Japan's defense capabilities grow, they complement our own efforts; and prevent trade frictions from jeopardizing Japanese-American security cooperation.

OBJECTIVES

At this SSC, we should seek these specific objectives:

1. Increase Japanese awareness of our mutual concerns in the global security environment. We will review developments in SALT, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, relations with the PRC and the growth of Soviet conventional military, (particularly naval) power. We will emphasize that US or allied forces countering the Soviets anywhere are acting also in the global interest of Japan and that Japanese forces countering the Soviets around the Japanese littoral are acting in the interests of the United States. We need, on the one hand, to reassure the Japanese of our determination to remain a major Pacific power, including maintenance of our military presence, and, on the other hand, to describe the challenges we face in ways that invite the GOJ to reconsider the adequacy of their own efforts--both in providing for their defense and in support of our efforts.
2. Insure the Japanese that the USG is politically committed to bilateral military planning as a means by which both sides can identify their defense needs more clearly and to support the continuation and sophistication of such efforts in the future. We will provide our assessment of the planning effort under the guidelines to date and indicate our support for increasingly realistic scenarios in the future. We can expect the Japanese to query us rather specifically on such matters as joint training and exercises, secure communications, intelligence exchanges, etc.
3. Describe realistically our force posture in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas and explain to the Japanese our appreciation of the shared necessity in maintaining free trade access to these ocean areas. We need to add realism to Japanese thinking which has questioned on occasion our ability to come to their local defense in times of a worldwide conflict. We will try to accomplish this by discussing more explicitly the linkages between our commitments in East Asia and the Middle East, and the indirect threats -- i.e., extraregional threats -- to Japan's security. We want to correct misimpressions from the past (e.g. projections of Seventh Fleet sizing). We will emphasize that U.S. forces countering the USSR in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas are acting in the interests of Japan. We will point out that US forces are capable of deploying east or west as they did in Vietnam, noting that earmarking forces for a certain area does not mean unequal treatment of other areas but is merely a recognition of possible threat scenarios. We want to indicate the firmness of our commitment and the flexibility of our forces while explaining our problems, especially from the late 1980's when our force levels may decline. We should not be bashful about discussing fiscal realities and the constraints and uncertainties that they introduce in our force structure.

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We might also probe, outside the formal meetings, Japanese attitudes as to whether GOJ maritime and air forces operating in the seas west of Guam and north of the Bashi channel in regional SLOC protection missions would be constitutionally permissible and/or politically manageable.

4. Promote a further expansion of GOJ cost-sharing measures and explore informally various possibilities. Following conclusion of the Brown-Kanemaru talks last year, the GOJ adopted a new \$120 million cost-sharing package for JFY 79, bringing the total GOJ expenditure for US Forces for the year to approximately \$750 million. Although cost-sharing has been increasing of late, the GOJ bureaucracy feels it has very little additional maneuvering room within the SOFA on future labor cost-sharing arrangements. It is absolutely necessary, however, that other avenues be sought. And we will need to persuade the Japanese that we expect US political and economic pressures for cost-sharing will increase. Some specific measures we can explore include:

- Joint use of both US and Japanese bases with the GOJ assuming a progressively larger share of maintenance and security costs.
- Japanese construction of new joint operational facilities.
- Japanese funding of depot level maintenance efforts.

5. Defuse Japanese criticism of unequal treatment compared to our NATO Allies. We will tell the Japanese of our attempts to eliminate inequalities which exist in areas such as communications security, limitations on and delays in equipment purchases, technology transfer, etc. At the same time, we will point out to the Japanese some of the reciprocal obligations embodied in NATO arrangements, e.g. long term defense program.

PROCEDURE

We will want to conduct the SSC informally. The arrangements for the meetings (social events, seating arrangements, dress stipulation) are designed to insure such informality. We will have to deal with the propensity of the Japanese press to exaggerate what the USG is asking of the GOJ by limiting both sides' public statements to generalities and giving the meeting a low public profile.

Schedule of Events

This SSC spans three days. There will be a no host, get acquainted social function the evening of July 30. Formal morning and afternoon sessions are scheduled for July 31 and August 1. The Japanese will host a luncheon and evening reception on July 31, and we will host a social function the evening of August 1. The final morning, August 2, is deliberately open so that it can be utilized flexibility for another formal session following up unfinished business, for private meetings, golf, Pearl Harbor tours, etc. We will host a luncheon on the final day which will be followed by a free discussion session to allow each delegation to raise any desired issue(s). Conclusion of this session in the late afternoon allows evening departures if delegates desire.

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TALKING PAPER

FOR

FIRST SESSION - U.S. - JAPAN SSC
July 31 - August 2, 1979

SUBJECT: Review of Major Global Issues

1/ Introduction

- Since the last SCC there have been rather dramatic changes in the security landscape--SALT II agreement; developments in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia; challenges to the Western position in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf; the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and the normalization of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations; further changes in our Korean policy; and the situation in Indochina.

✓ - In discussing these developments we will be particularly interested in exploring their implications for U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation.

2/ SALT II and U.S. Nuclear Strategy

- Let me start with SALT II. I won't repeat the details of the agreement. A short paper outlining the agreement has been passed to you. Neither will I rehearse the arguments and counterarguments that have surfaced in Washington. I would only like to make a few key points.

- First, a few words about its political implications.

-- Within the U.S. there has been growing concern about the growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional military power, as well as Soviet involvement in Africa and elsewhere. This concern is reflected most notably in growing public and Congressional support for real increases in defense spending.

-- The Soviet response has been ambivalent. During 1978, Moscow showed somewhat greater caution in Africa, but they increased their activities on their strategic periphery in Norway, in the Middle-East, and in Northeast Asia--perhaps in part due to a self-induced fear of encirclement.

✓ -- The net result is that the debate over SALT II has become more than a debate on strategic arms limitation treaty. Ratification of the treaty thus takes on greater significance.

- We believe that the SALT II Agreement serves the interests of global stability by imposing limits on the numbers of central strategic systems.

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✓ -- The numerical limits in the treaty actually require that the Soviets dismantle over 250 launchers by the end of 1985. These limits provide greater predictability as to the size of our future strategic challenge and enable us to better plan our own strategic capabilities.

✓ -- SALT II does not preclude U.S. efforts to modernize its own strategic forces, e.g. providing the MINUTEMAN III with improved accuracy, developing a mobile ICBM, continuing deployment of the TRIDENT SLBM system, equipping our B-52s with air launched cruise missiles, and developing SLCM and GLCM technology.

✓ -- With regard to verification, the treaty does not require that we trust the Soviets. The loss of our sites in Iran will temporarily limit our information on some aspects of Soviet programs. In any case, the treaty is verifiable from signing, i.e. we could detect any violations that threaten our security. Since strategic systems take years to develop, we are confident that we can detect and respond to any Soviet cheating before it could affect the strategic balance.

✓ -- Finally, the treaty clearly takes our allies' interests into account. Strategic equivalence is maintained; U.S. Forward Based Systems are not included; NATO options to modernize long-range theater nuclear forces with cruise missiles are fully preserved; existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation between the U.S. and its allies are unaffected. The non-circumvention provision is simply a reiteration of obligations under international law, and we successfully resisted Soviet attempts to include a no-transfer ban in the treaty. In addition, our position is that any future limits on U.S. systems primarily designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limits on Soviet theater systems.

✓ - What are the chances of ratification by the U.S. Senate? Consensus building takes time. Many Senators have expressed reservations about the treaty. All are examining the treaty with care. The initial round of hearings has given us a chance to address the Senators' concerns. The treaty has won support from distinguished outsiders (list some - Toon, Harriman, Gaylor Kidd, Dougherty) and from the JCS. All of us have stressed the need for vigorous U.S. and allied defense efforts with regard to SALT. Whether these reservations can be answered during discussions or whether they will take the form of non-binding Senate resolutions or even amendments to the treaty is not clear at this time. However, we expect that the Senate will vote on the ratification of the treaty late this year--perhaps in early November.

-- Basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms contained in the SALT II Agreement sets very general guidelines. However, within the USG we are

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*We can out do Soviets in soc. pol, & econ areas but in military
they are superior.* ~~SECRET~~
U.S. & West have difficulty maintaining high level of mil involvement
studying alternative approaches to SALT III; and participating
in a special NATO planning group that is discussing how theater
nuclear forces might be addressed in SALT III.

3. Europe and NATO

- Since 1973 the Soviets have been expanding and improving their conventional and theater nuclear forces in Europe. The force expansion programs show signs of leveling off, but the modernization programs probably will continue at a rapid pace during the next few years. Specifically, since January 1973:

-- Soviet and NSWP forces have been increased by approximately 62,000 men with more than half the increase occurring in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and Polish ground forces;

-- There has been only a slight increase in tactical aircraft.

-- The East European states have improved their military organizations and capabilities and they now play a greater role in Pact military planning and strategy for employment.

- In response to this increased threat, NATO--to include the U.S.--has taken a number of steps to shore up the Alliance's defense posture.

-- This spring, at the DPC, the members of NATO reaffirmed their goal of a 3% real increase in annual defense expenditures; and, with minor exceptions, it appears that this goal will be met. (Table 1 indicates some measure of NATO's defense burden.)

-- A Long Term Defense Plan--with more than 120 specific measures to improve NATO's conventional forces--was adopted at the Washington Summit in May of last year and we are making good progress in implementing it. A brief summary of the LTDP has been given to your delegation.

-- NATO is also taking steps to improve both its battlefield and longer-range theater nuclear weapon systems.

- I would like to emphasize three general points about our efforts in NATO.

-- First, our current efforts are designed to correct the consequences of prolonged neglect arising out of our involvement in Vietnam.

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-- Second, improvements in Europe are not coming at the expense of our forces in Asia. Our NATO defenses complement our forces in East Asia and the Western Pacific and vice versa. We are continuing to honor our pledge to maintain our current level of forces in the Pacific--and we are making some quantitative, as well as qualitative, improvements to our forces in the region.

-- Third, as you are well aware, we are facing an adversary who is making extraordinary efforts in developing his military forces. However, the strength of the free world lies in our alliance structure. Although the Soviet Union may be outspending the U.S., the defense spending of the U.S. and other NATO nations, when combined, is greater than the Soviet Union plus its Warsaw Pact allies. Table 2 shows this fact graphically. Our security depends on our ability to capitalize on our combined strength.

- Before we turn our attention to Asia, I would like to say a few words about the Middle East.

4. The Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean

- The U.S., Japan, and the rest of the industrialized nations share a major interest in the Middle East--unimpeded access to oil. That is one reason we are so concerned about recent events in Iran, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Yemen.

✓ - The major threats to unimpeded access to Middle East oil center around a renewal of the Arab-Israeli conflict, radical and Soviet-sponsored adventurism, and internal instability.

-- Our response must include effective follow through on the Camp David accords, countering Soviet supported adventurism (as in North Yemen), and dealing with those conditions which generate internal instability.

✓ - The U.S. has maintained a military presence in the Indian Ocean for thirty years in the form of the MIDEAST force and routine deployments of additional naval forces.

✓ -- We have augmented this presence during periods of crisis.

✓ -- Currently, the U.S. Navy presence in the Indian Ocean includes the MIDEAST Force (three permanently deployed surface combatants) plus the deployment three times a year of alternating carrier battle groups and surface combatant

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What I mean
concerning "plans" to
support stabil. is not
too easy to know
and

~~water at 50~~
depends on US role of possible outcome
- if advantages to west - "final" supports
Soviet Union don't US have out vs not power
in Asia now -
However
- next August will come from
development for 6th
7th, not further down down.

COMPARISON OF 1978 DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

BILLIONS FY 80
DOLLARS

240

U.S. AND ALLIES

224
AUS/NZ 4
JAPAN 11

92
OTHER
NATO

117
U.S.

160

80

0

WARSAW PACT

191
26
OTHER
PACT

165
USSR

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task groups. (Right now there is a surface task group of a cruiser, three destroyers/frigates, and an oiler in the Indian Ocean).

-- In addition, a detachment of Navy patrol aircraft (P-3s) has been staging out of Diego Garcia on a continuous basis since 1974; and, more recently, U.S. P-3s have operated out of Singapore.

- The Department of Defense has recently recommended:

-- The MIDEAST Task Force be augmented on a permanent basis by two or three surface combatants drawn from our forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean;

-- Periodic task force deployments from the Atlantic and Pacific be increased from three to four per year and if feasible include a Marine Amphibious Task Force;

-- At least one land-based tactical aircraft be deployed to the region periodically; and

-- Steps be taken to improve our security relations with the regional states and improve their self defense capabilities as well as our capability to support our forces in the region.

- The President has not yet made a decision on this recommendation. But some expanded deployments are likely to reflect our awareness of the strategic significance of Middle Eastern oil.

note
Stol of MG vital to "J". "J" supports us about.
lets press report about - walls down -
ask about us pol for MG.
MG - Unlocked Force - had locks - not go alone
Rds 1 1/2 war - have limited congressional -
AB, Korea, etc

MCG
10 arts talks - send resumé - the Sov entered Ethiopia
~~SECRET~~
told them this coming to their government -
does "J" think it wise to issue IO talk?

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Session 1, Part 2
Current Asian Situation (Mr. Armacost)

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1. The security situation in East Asia has been substantially transformed in recent months.

1 On the positive side of the ledger there have been these key developments:

2 American military power in the Pacific has been stabilized.

3 US-Japan defense cooperation is greater than ever before.

4 The proliferation of Sino-Japanese and Sino-US economic technological, and scientific exchanges tend to confirm Beijing's "opening to the West."

5 Seoul has continued to outdistance Pyongyang in the political-economic competition on the Korean Peninsula.

6 Sino-Soviet rivalry shows no sign of abating; and recent conventional military conflicts in East Asia have been limited to the communist countries.

7 Taiwan is adjusting well to Sino-US normalization.

8 The Soviet Union has been unable to translate its growing military power in the Pacific into unilateral political advantage.

9 The ASEAN states -- individually and collectively -- have displayed impressive resilience and cohesion.

10 The Pacific Basin economy remains strong, providing the underpinnings for political stability in the non-communist, market economy countries.

11 The Pacific Island mini-states have made (or are making) the transition to independence without undue strife or external manipulation.

All in all these are hopeful trends, and our joint interests are served by working to consolidate them.

b. On the negative side of the ledger, there have also been some developments which cause concern.

The Soviet Union continues to expand its capacity to project power into the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean: expansion of Soviet Far Eastern forces; deployment of the Minsk and the Ivan Rogov to Vladivostok; increased fortifications in the

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✓ Northern Territories; acquisition of limited military operating rights in Vietnam; provision of massive military supplies to Vietnam, thereby facilitating SRV aggression in Cambodia.

✓ The erosion of Western influence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean littoral combined with the establishment of a stronger Soviet military foothold in Southeast Asia, raises new questions about the security of these sources of oil which are so critical to security of Japan and the United States, and, to a lesser extent about the security of the SLOCs themselves. In addition, we have seen the problem that even a small loss of oil production can cause the world economy.

✓ The presence of seven Vietnamese divisions on the Thai border creates an obvious potential for incidents and poses risks that the conflict may spill over into Thailand.

✓ The conflicts in Indochina have forced not only Thailand but Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore to reconsider the adequacy of their defenses.

✓ The massive exodus of refugees from Indochina has become an enormous humanitarian problem in Southeast Asia; and its has some security overtones since the large influx of Chinese could disrupt the internal balance in Malaysia and Indonesia, and could induce "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies between the ASEAN members.

✓ Sino-Vietnamese conflict could recur.

✓ In Korea, new intelligence information reveals that we previously underestimated North Korea's military strength; more urgent efforts are required to overcome deficiencies in ROK defenses, particularly its ground defenses.

✓ We have begun to chart responses to these developments, but much remains to be done.

✓ With respect to the expanding Soviet military access to Indochina, we should work to see that Moscow pays a high political and diplomatic price throughout the region as a result of its entree to military facilities in the SRV, and its underwriting of Hanoi's invasion in Cambodia.

✓ Recent developments in some of the Indian Ocean littoral states require that the United States expand deployments into that area. There may be some diversion of assets currently assigned to the Pacific. Insofar as US assets are stretched thinner, we need to consider how we can complement each other's efforts more effectively in protecting the SLOCs, (i.e., ASW, surveillance, patrolling, etc.) and in promoting stability in major supplier countries.

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✓ We have attempted to minimize the dangers to Thailand posed by SRV invasion of Cambodia by 1) reaffirming our commitment to Thai security; 2) warning the Vietnamese and Soviets of the consequences of allowing the conflict to spread into Thailand; and 3) expanding our security assistance to the RTG, including the acceleration of equipment deliveries.

✓ Beyond this, the efficacy of our efforts to encourage a political resolution of the Kampuchean problem will turn upon the balance of forces which develops in Kampuchea over the coming months. We are seeking to forestall recognition of the Heng Samrin puppet regime; and keeping the idea of an international conference on Kampuchea alive. (Note helpful GOJ role on refugees and economic aid.)

✓ The other ASEAN countries require our support to increase the readiness of their defenses without jeopardizing development programs. The United States is attempting to preserve -- and to the extent possible, expand -- FMS credit levels, expeditiously process requests for defensive equipment, and handle arms transfer requests with greater sensitivity to ASEAN requirements. Difficulties in the short-term include: 1) an austere budget; 2) a depletion of excess defense stocks; and 3) legal inhibitions against airlifting equipment. Explore whether Japan might be able to lend additional help through the provision of fungible economic assistance. (E.g. something analogous to our SSA)

✓ With respect to China, it is in neither of our interests unwittingly to promote China's efforts to forge an anti-Soviet "common front." The appropriate stance for us is 1) deepened US-GOJ defense cooperation, and 2) promotion in parallel of our respective bilateral political and economic relationships with Beijing.

✓ In Korea, recently announced adjustments of US troop withdrawals will bolster deterrence, and the ROK has agreed substantially to augment its own defense effort. Given the high rate of inflation in the ROK, these steps may exacerbate domestic economic problems. It would be helpful if the GOJ could look at ways in which it might contribute to ROK security by easing these economic difficulties -- e.g., liberalizing trade access, expanding credit, etc.

✓ On refugees, acknowledge Japan's initiative dramatically to expand its financial support for the UNHCR, and take note of the fact that we are implementing steps which involve a wider DOD contribution to the refugee effort.

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SESSION 3

US Force Posture in Asia and Indian Ocean in 1980's.
(LTG Lawson)

Our objective during this session is to describe realistically our force posture in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas and explain to the Japanese our appreciation of the shared necessity in maintaining free trade access to the nations bordering these ocean areas.

Talking Points

- Introduction. Earlier in our discussions we indicated that:
 - Overall we believe that the Asian security situation is relatively stable.
 - The U.S. is committed to remaining militarily powerful in East Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as well as to maintaining our strategic nuclear equivalence vis-a-vis the Soviets. However, we view with concern the Soviets increasing conventional military, particularly naval, buildup and will act jointly with our allies and friends to meet this challenge.
 - But before we focus on United States force posture in Asia and Indian Ocean in 1980's, I will briefly discuss recent Soviet military activities in Asia and developments in the Indian Ocean and Middle East.
 - ✓ -- The recent opening of Vietnamese ports and airfields to Soviet forces could have far-reaching consequences in the Western Pacific, should the Vietnamese give political approval to continuation of such activities. For example:
 - Such bases could provide convenient staging points for Soviet forces and improve Soviet capabilities to sustain their forces in both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Vietnamese basing could also provide the Soviets with facilities for crew shore leave, replenishment, and repair for both forces in transit and those operating in these areas.

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- Soviet reaction times would be improved. For example, Vladivostok is about 1,900nm from Subic Bay and about 2,900nm from Singapore; Cam Ranh Bay is only 650nm from Subic and 700nm from Singapore.
- Soviet forces operating from Vietnam could also conduct surveillance of the vital sea lines of communications in the region as well as monitor U.S. Navy activities in the area. For example, Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft and IL-38 ASW aircraft operating from Vietnam could cover the Lombok, Sunda and Malacca Straits. They could also monitor, on a continuous basis, U.S. carrier and other naval operations in the Subic Bay operating area.
- In support of the Vietnamese, Soviet naval aircraft could provide a quick reaction maritime patrol and surveillance capability in the South China Sea as well as search for Chinese ships supporting Kampuchean forces.
- The Soviets may also use Vietnamese Naval Bases and airfields as staging bases for exercises in the South China and Philippine Seas. In particular, coordinated ASW training would be enhanced by the short transit time and distance for their ASW aircraft.
- The principal threats to allied shipping in the Pacific are the Soviet general purpose submarine force and elements of the Soviet Naval Aviation forces (bombers with air-to-surface missiles).
- In the past, sea lanes in the Pacific were safer due to geographic and operating constraints on Soviet forces.
- ASW barriers in the exits to the Sea of Japan and off Petropavlovsk could inflict losses on Soviet submarines deploying and returning to their bases in Soviet Asia.

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- The range of the Soviet TU-16 equipped with surface-to-air missiles is approximately 1,450nm without aerial refueling and 2,050nm with one refueling. Operating from bases in Soviet Asia, these aircraft could operate only as far South as the northern Philippines.
- The addition of the BACKFIRE bomber to Soviet Naval Aviation forces in Asia and extended Soviet use of air and naval facilities in Vietnam would seriously impact on our defense planning.
- The BACKFIRE has an unrefueled combat radius of 2,600nm; almost twice that of the TU-16 it replaces. If used in an anti-shipping role and based in Soviet Asia, its unrefueled operating area would include the Philippine and South China Seas and this could be extended even further by using in-fight refueling.
- TU-95s and TU-16s operating extensively from Vietnam would provide the Soviets with SLOC surveillance throughout the Southern Pacific and the eastern portions of the Indian Ocean. They could also be provided fighter escorts, if necessary.
- Establishment of submarine operating bases in Vietnam would shorten transit time for Soviet submarines; make our ASW barriers at the exits to the Sea of Japan and in the vicinity of Petropavlovsk less effective; and, initially, would complicate our ASW efforts in the Western Pacific.
- In short, Soviet bases in Vietnam would significantly enhance Soviet capabilities to interdict allied sea lines of communications in Asia during the early stages of a major conflict.
- I would now like to turn to the Indian Ocean and discuss recent events in that region.

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- The U.S. has maintained a military presence in the Middle East for thirty years in the form of the MIDEAST Force which has historically been comprised of a command ship and two destroyer type ships. We have augmented this force during periods of crisis such as the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and most recently as a result of the fighting in Yemen. We have also deployed on a yearly basis both carrier battle groups and surface combatant task groups from Seventh Fleet assets in the Western Pacific. Normally, the carrier battle group makes one deployment to the Indian Ocean for about 45-60 days. The other two deployments of like duration by our surface combatants are typically made up of a guided missile cruiser, three escorts, and a mobile logistics ship.
- In addition, a detachment of Navy patrol aircraft (P-3s) has been operating from Diego Garcia on a continuous basis since 1974; and, more recently, U.S. P-3s have used Singapore facilities for transit purposes.
- As a result of recent events in the Middle East, the U.S. is considering several proposals concerning its military presence in the region. These include increasing the number and type of forces permanently stationed in the area; increasing the frequency of our naval deployments; and, perhaps, deploying land-based aircraft to the region on a random basis.
- The rationale behind proposals to increase U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean is that positive steps are needed in the aftermath of events in Iran, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and now Yemen to reassure U.S. allies who feel threatened by Soviet activities and to demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect its interests in the region.

✓ - In the face of the Soviet developments I have just described, the US has not stood still. We have maintained our military strength in Asia. In fact, we have increased our forces somewhat while continuing to improve them qualitatively. The outlook for the 1980's is as follows:

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✓-- Navy

--- The Seventh Fleet represents the forward deployed naval component of CINCPAC's forces. Centered around two carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready groups, its principal missions include peacetime presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, contingency response, SLOC protection and offensive operations in wartime.

✓-- Despite uncertainties about funding levels and procurement programs, total Navy force levels should slowly increase through the years. Moreover, the increase will be concentrated in major surface combatants and attack submarines while offsetting reductions will come from the ranks of auxiliaries and reserve ships. Particularly significant, I think, is the increased use that we will be making of civilian-manned MSC fleet support ships. In general, we expect that the Pacific Fleet's share of total Navy assets will remain close to the present ratio. Moreover, our forces are inherently flexible, and can meet worldwide requirements. During Vietnam, we augmented the Pacific fleet with ships from the Atlantic. More recently, we drew on ships from both the Mediterranean and Pacific to enhance our presence temporarily in the Indian Ocean. We will continue to respond to those threats which directly affect our interests, in close consultation with our allies. *1970*

✓-- In addition to the carrier air wings afloat, significant numbers of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft are located at bases ashore. ASW patrol aircraft (P-3s) regularly operate from several fields ranging from Adak, Alaska to Diego Garcia. Support and special mission squadrons are similarly deployed. Marine Corps attack or fighter-attack squadrons are located in Japan and Hawaii, and a detachment of AV-8 HARRIERs is on Okinawa.

✓-- By the end of the FYDP period, all carrier air wing F-4s, with the exception of those on Midway and Coral Sea, will have been replaced with F-14s. F/A-18s will be introduced to Marine Corps fighter squadrons. Carriers will begin receiving F/A-18s. Land-based ASW capabilities will be improved with the P-3 update program. Surface ship ASW will be markedly enhanced by the introduction of a new towed array and the LAMPS MK III helicopter.

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✓- Air Force

✓--- PACAF controls ten tactical fighter squadrons, totalling 192 F-4s. Two squadrons are in the Philippines, four are on Okinawa, and four are in Korea. Those at Osan, Kunsan and Taegu are specifically tasked for Korea; the rest are available for general Asian contingencies. Two tactical airlift squadrons in Japan and the Philippines, plus some reconnaissance and special operations units, round out the inventory.

✓--- F-15s will begin operating from Kadena next year. All squadrons in Japan will transition to the F-15, the first AWACS will be on rotation to Kadena, and F-4G WILD WEASEL aircraft will deploy to Clark. We plan that F-16s will replace F-4s in Korea and a total of five AWACS will be available in WESTPAC.

-- Major Ground Forces

✓--- The 28,000 troops of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) are part of the Combined Forces Command's strategic reserve. By July 1979, 3,700 men had been withdrawn. By Presidential decision:

✓--- Withdrawals of combat elements of the 2d Division will remain in abeyance. The structure and function of the Combined Forces Command will continue as established last year.

---- Between now and the end of 1980 some reductions of personnel in U.S. support units will continue. This will include one I-HAWK air defense battalion whose transfer to the ROK had been planned since 1976.

✓--- The timing and pace of withdrawals beyond these will be re-examined in 1981. In that review the United States will pay special attention to the restoration of a satisfactory North-South military balance, and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula.

---- No changes in Marine Corps deployments are programmed.

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- ✓ We also have afloat a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and a Battalion Landing Team (BLT). These units are deployed in the Western Pacific aboard two Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG). Totaling about 3,100 men, they provide rapid reaction forces for limited contingencies in the region. No force level changes are programmed, but amphibious shipping with Marines embarked may be deployed more often into the Indian Ocean.
- ✓ The 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, with its reserve roundout brigade, constitutes CINCPAC's strategic reserve. The remaining brigade of the 3d Marine Division also is based on Oahu. Although no decisions have been made, the future configuration and orientation of the 25th Division is under review.
- ✓ In the Eastern Pacific, we have I MAF, consisting of the 1st Marine Division and the 3d MAW, located at Camp Pendleton. No change is contemplated for the employment of I MAF.

✓ Strategic Forces

- ✓ A squadron of B-52Ds, various tanker and reconnaissance units, and 10 POLARIS-equipped SSBNs are based in Guam. Additional reconnaissance and support forces are located throughout PACOM. The first TRIDENT submarine is expected to deploy to the Pacific in FY 1981.

✓ Mobility Forces

- ✓ The Military Airlift Command (MAC) operates 70 C-5A and 234 C-141 transports. Although largely based in the Continental US, these aircraft contribute to our capabilities in all theaters. Their range and payload are essential to our ability to deliver reinforcements during Korean and Persian Gulf contingencies. In the last few years, mid-air refueling techniques have further enhanced the responsiveness of our strategic airlift. The C-141B stretch program will add 30 percent to the payload of each aircraft, along with improved fuel economy and aerial refueling probes. Planned modifications to the C-5 wings will extend the service life of these unique transports through the end of the century.

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✓ Limited Contingency Force

✓ A limited contingency force is being developed consisting of land, naval, and air forces capable of responding to a wide range of non-NATO contingencies with emphasis on the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Korea. The contingency force will have strategic mobility and will be largely independent of overseas bases and support. The exact size and composition of forces for any particular contingency will necessarily depend upon the nature and location of the contingency. It is envisaged that the force will generally be self-sustaining and capable of operating in an austere environment for at least 60 days.

✓ Indian Ocean

✓ Thus far, the majority of Indian Ocean deployments have come from PACOM, but EUCOM contributions could increase in the future. It is anticipated that a policy decision will be made shortly to modestly increase MIDEASTFOR on a permanent basis; and increase periodic naval deployments (drawing from PACOM and EUCOM). U.S. capabilities throughout the Indian Ocean area suffer from a lack of supporting infrastructure. Programmed improvements to facilities on Diego Garcia should be completed by the end of FY 1980, but the island will remain a very austere base. Aircraft parking space would be a particular problem during periods of heavy use.

✓ Summary. As you see, our forces will be maintained essentially at present levels with significant added qualitative improvements. However, Navy's overall force size remains a long-term concern to us, particularly as we encounter additional requirements in the Indian Ocean. Eventual outcome will depend not only on multi-year funding levels, but also on Navy programming decisions, national political commitments, allied contributions and the nature of the threat. Nonetheless, the capability, and probably the size, of the fleet will grow at least through the mid-1980's and there still is time to make decisions for the longer term on a deliberate basis. This overview has focused mostly on in-place forces. However, the combination of sealift, mid-air refueling, strategic airlift and the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) also allows us to reinforce rapidly in contingencies anywhere in the world. Specific deployment rates are very sensitive to assumptions about the scenario. For example, simultaneous crises in Europe and the ROK would spread our mobility forces very thin. Allied air and sealift would become very important. Nevertheless, our own capabilities are substantial.

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